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Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused by Households: Uncertainty, Prices, and Income  
 
1. Introduction 
Air pollution caused by households burning wood for heating and cooking is a serious concern in 
many urban areas of the developing world. To illustrate the problem consider the city of 
Temuco, the capital city of the Araucanía region in southern Chile.  This city contains about 
350,000 people in about 86,000 households.  It has been estimated that 90% of total emissions of 
suspended particulate matter in Temuco is caused by households burning 500,000 cubic meters 
of wood annually.  There are about 100,000 smoke stacks connected to cooking and heating 
stoves in the city (Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente, CONAMA 2007, Chávez et. al 
2009).  The number of days that the concentration of total suspended particulate matter (PM10) 
exceeded the 24-hour average Chilean legal limit of 150 μg/m
3 was 11 in 2005, 15 in 2006, 21 in 
2007, 36 in 2008, and 37 in 2009.  Furthermore, during the 2009 season, the maximum daily 
average concentration on a 24 hour basis for the city was in the range of 800-1020 μg/m
3.  
During the worst day of the 2009 season, the concentration of PM10 was measured at about 6090 
μg/m
3 at 5 p.m., increasing to 6240 μg/m
3 by 11 p.m. that same day. To put these figures in 
context, the Air Quality Guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO) call for limiting 
the mean 24-hour concentration of  PM10 in urban areas to 50 μg/m
3 (WHO 2005).  
Moreover, there are at least two reasons to be pessimistic about air quality in Temuco.  
First, generating household energy with kerosene or liquefied gas —the two closest substitutes 
for wood in central-southern Chile— is about 5 to 8 times more expensive than using fuel wood 
(Gómez-Lobo 2005). Second, the supply of wood from native forests surrounding the cities is 
also increasing, as many campesinos harvest wood to sell in urban areas.   Even though an 
official figure of the number of campesinos supplying wood to Temuco is not available, the 3 
 
National Forest Service had registered about 470 producers.  Most of these producers are owners 
of small plots of land less than 100 hectares (Lobos 2001 and Von Baer et. al. 2002).
1  
Situations like this pose major challenges for environmental regulatory authorities at 
local and national levels. The great number of individual sources of pollution makes direct 
emissions monitoring impractical; thus, air pollution from households is best characterized as a 
nonpoint pollution problem. The inability to monitor emissions implies that regulation is likely to 
be directed at emissions inputs, in particular wood consumption and household combustion 
technologies. In addition, regulators face a great deal of uncertainty because of stochastic 
weather effects on the concentration of air pollution and human health, and because of limited 
information about how households use combustion technologies and the wood input. Finally, 
choices of wood consumption or more efficient combustion technologies are subtractions from or 
contributions to a pure public good (i.e., air quality). It is well known by public economists that 
one cannot separate efficient provision of a public good from the distribution of income. (For 
example, see Laffont 1988, chapter 2). The main objective of this paper is to examine the role 
that income distribution plays in the determination of policies to control urban air pollution from 
households.  
  Our approach is to consider optimal taxes for wood consumption for household energy 
and subsidies for more energy efficient (less polluting) combustion technologies.  We recognize 
that wood taxes or technology subsidies may not be implementable in particular instances, 
                                                 
1 Air pollution problems caused by households burning wood for heating have also occurred in 
some regions of developed countries.  Examples include the city of Christchurch in New Zealand 
(Barna and Gimson 2002, Environment Canterbury 2009, and Wilton et. al. 2006), the city of 
Launceston in Australia (Kesby et. al. 2002, Luhar et. al. 2006), Sacramento California 
(Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management District 2006 and 2008), the town of Libby 
Montana (HPBA 2008), and British Columbia in Canada (Ministry of Environment-British 
Columbia 2005).   4 
 
because of monitoring, other information problems, and political realities. Nevertheless, deriving 
the optimal taxes and subsidies can yield important insights into the problem of controlling air 
pollution from households.
2  In particular, we show that if authorities are able and willing to 
make unrestricted lump sum transfers of income among households, then these prices should be 
roughly equal across households.  However, it is unrealistic to assume that lump sum income 
redistributions can be made part of a policy to control household air pollution.  In the absence of 
lump sum transfers and assuming diminishing marginal utility of consumption of a private good, 
an optimal policy will force more of the burden of emissions control onto wealthier households. 
Thus, an optimal policy will charge a higher wood tax on wealthier households, as well as offer 
them a higher subsidy for the purchase of more efficient combustion technologies. This last 
result may seem paradoxical, but it is important to realize that the technology subsidy is not 
meant to correct income disparities—its purpose is to aid in the control of household pollution. 
The subsidy is higher for higher income households because this is an avenue by which more of 
the control burden is optimally placed on these households.  
  While the role that income distribution plays in the setting of environmental taxes has 
been well-studied by environmental economists, it is usually in the context of uniform taxes. 
Therefore, the question of how income distribution affects the distribution of control 
responsibilities is usually not addressed.
3 One exception is Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) who 
examine how the global distribution of income affects the efficient distribution of greenhouse 
                                                 
2 There is a proposed plan for the city of Temuco that offers subsidies to induce voluntary 
adoption of more efficient combustion technologies.   The main feature is a subsidy-based stove 
exchange program to induce the renovation of 12,000 stoves over a ten year period (CONAMA 
2007, Chapter II, Article 10).   
3 For example, this is true of Sandmo’s (1975) classic article on optimal commodity taxation in 




gas abatement to confront climate change. They show that the familiar prescription that marginal 
abatement costs should be equal across countries only holds if countries commit themselves to 
large-scale transfers of income from richer to poorer nations.  In the absence of these transfers 
the efficient distribution of abatement requires that richer countries undertake more abatement 
than would be implied by equalizing marginal abatement costs.
4  
  Our contribution is that we examine the environmental policy/income distribution 
connection in the context of a nonpoint pollution problem.  Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) assume 
perfect information about all benefits and costs of greenhouse gas control, while regulators have 
only limited information about these elements in the control of air pollution caused by 
households.  More importantly, Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) assume that greenhouse gas 
emissions are perfectly observable. For our problem it is not practical to monitor household 
emissions; thus, control policies are likely to focus on controlling the inputs of the production of 
pollution, namely the fuel input and the combustion technology. There is an extensive literature 
on nonpoint pollution control, of which Shortle and Horan (2001) have provided a valuable 
review. However, we are not aware of any study that considers the impact of income distribution 
on the optimal control of a nonpoint pollutant. Our work makes this contribution to the nonpoint 
control literature in general, as well as to the study of the control of air pollution caused by 
households in the developing world in particular.  
   The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we lay out a model of the 
control of air pollution caused by households burning wood for energy, and derive the optimal 
taxes on wood consumption and subsidies for more efficient combustion technologies.  The main 
results of the paper are contained in section 3 where we examine the interdependence between 
                                                 
4 Also see Heal, Chichilnisky and Starret (1993).  Sheeran (2006) seeks to clarify certain aspects 
of Chichilnisky’s and Heal’s analysis.  6 
 
optimal policies and income distribution.  We conclude in section 4 with an extended discussion 
of several implementation issues that our results generate.   
 
2. A model of regulating air pollution from households 
Consider an urban area consisting of a large number of households that produce energy by 
burning wood. Each household makes a small contribution to pollution levels, but the resulting 
aggregate level is dangerous for the community. Due to the large number of polluting 
households, an environmental authority is unable to measure emissions from each household. 
Consequently, we explore the design of taxes to induce lower wood consumption and subsidies 
to promote the adoption of cleaner-burning wood combustion technologies.
5 
 
2.1 Basics of the model 
Let there be n households indexed by i. Each household produces energy by combining a 
combustion technology, which we denote as 1 i x , and the amount of wood used,  2 i x .  Thus, the 
production of energy in a household is given by  
[1]  12 (, ) ii i i cc x x = . 
Assume that  i c  is increasing in fuel use  2 i x . We interpret  1 i x as an index of available wood 
combustion technologies and order the technologies according to their effectiveness in producing 
energy given an amount of fuel. Assume that more effective combustion technologies are 
                                                 
5 Another option would be to pursue an ambient pollution tax and subsidy as first proposed by 
Segerson (1988). This policy would involve household-specific penalties if the ambient 
concentration of air pollution surpasses some limit and subsidies if the concentration is lower 
than that limit. Despite the interest in these mechanisms for controlling nonpoint pollution, we 
are not aware of an instance in which they have been applied. Shortle and Horan (2001) discuss 
several practical limitations of these mechanisms. 7 
 
indicated by higher levels of  1 i x  so that  i c  is increasing in  1 i x .   For analytic convenience we 
assume that  1 i x  is a continuous variable.
6 There may very well be uncertainty from a regulator’s 
perspective about  i c , perhaps because of unobservable skill levels or wood quality, but we 
ignore this possibility because households’ energy production is not our primary concern.   
Our main concern is that energy production creates emissions of pollution,  i r , as a 
byproduct.  Thus, household emissions depend on the combustion technology, the wood input, 
and a random parameter   i σ  (from a regulator’s point of view) that captures unobserved 
variation in how the combustion equipment is actually used:  
[2]  12 (, ,) ii i ii rr x x σ = .    
Suppose that  i r  is increasing in the amount of wood used, but is decreasing in the 
combustion technology (under the assumption that a more productive combustion technology 
burns more cleanly and uses less wood for the amount of energy generated). The random 
parameter  i σ  represents households’ preferences and skills that affect how the combustion 
equipment is used, and consequently the production of emissions.  For example, emissions are an 
increasing function of the moisture content of the wood used, and households choose wood with 
varying moisture content.
7  Furthermore, households can adjust the amount of wood burned per 
period of time by varying the air flow in and out of the combustion equipment. Reducing airflow 
increases burn time but also increases emissions.  Overfilling the combustion chamber with 
                                                 
6 Assuming that the combustion technology is a continuous variable may not be too far from the 
truth. Combustion technologies can vary along several dimensions including type, size, vintage, 
and so on. Treating each combination of characteristics as a distinct technology can produce a 
large number of technologies that, when ordered according to energy-producing efficiency, can 
be modeled as being on a continuum.   
7 It has been reported in the city of Temuco that some households actually prefer to use wetter 
wood even though it has lower caloric content, because moist wood burns slower and lasts longer 
(Chávez et. al. 2009, CONAMA-DICTUC 2008, CONAMA 2007, Nussbaumer 2006).  8 
 
wood to avoid frequent refilling can also produce higher emissions (Klippel and Nussbaumer 
2007; Nussbaumer 2003 and 2006).  
Environmental quality in a city depends on the ambient concentration of pollution. The 
main pollutants produced from burning wood are nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, and fine 
particulate matter. To simplify matters, we assume that household emissions produce a single 
pollutant. In addition we assume that this pollutant is uniformly mixed; that is, the ambient 
concentration of the pollutant depends only on the sum of household emissions. This assumption 
makes the location of emissions irrelevant, which is a reasonable approximation for pollution 
problems in the cities that motivate this work.











⎝⎠ ∑ , 
which is increasing in aggregate household emissions so it is increasing in individual household 
emissions as well. The parameter θ  is a random factor that captures the effect of weather 
conditions on air quality. For example, windy days result in lower ambient pollution for a given 
level of emissions because pollution is blown away and dispersed. However, cold can produce a 
thermal inversion that traps pollutants at ground level, resulting in higher ambient concentration 
of pollution.  
The utility function for a household is denoted by  
[4] ( , , , , ) ii i i i uu c y a μ η = .  
                                                 
8 As noted in the introduction our work is motivated by household pollution problems in urban 
areas of the central-southern region of Chile.  Most of these areas are located in the central 
valley, on relatively flat land surrounded by small hills, away from the Los Andes mountain 
range. The many emission points are quite uniformly distributed within each city. We should 
note that the model can be easily modified to consider non-uniformly mixed pollutants.  9 
 
Suppose that utility is increasing in energy use  i c  and the consumption of a private 
commodity i y , but is decreasing in ambient pollution a.  Note that since the ambient 
concentration of pollution affects each household’s utility, their choices of combustion 
technology and wood consumption can be viewed as contributions to and subtractions from the 
local public good of air quality. The variable μ  is a random parameter that captures the notion 
that weather affects household energy choices. Think of households generating more energy to 
heat their homes when it is colder. We assume for simplicity that the distributions of the random 
weather parameters, μ and θ , are known to all households as well as to the regulator.  The last 
term in a household’s utility function,  i η , is a random term from the regulator’s perspective that 
represents unobservable household characteristics that affect its production of energy, like the 
insulation of the house, preferences for the type of combustion equipment, and preferences for 
warmth.   
Each household faces a set of prices for the combustion technology and wood input, 
which we denote as  1 p  and  2 p , respectively. To keep the model tractable and focused we 
assume that these prices are fixed throughout. Relaxing this assumption would not change the 
fundamental insights of this paper about the role of income distribution in the design of policies 
to control household air pollution.  The price of the private consumption good is equal to one.   
We further simplify the analysis by assuming that each household i has exogenous 
income  i w , which is taxed at an exogenous rate  i z .  Income taxes are fixed because real 
environmental agencies do not have the authority to make income transfers a part of 
environmental regulations.  We will see later that this assumption plays a very important role in 
policy formation.  10 
 
We can obtain principles for controlling urban air pollution from households by deriving 
the optimal subsidies on combustion technologies and taxes on wood. Anticipating that optimal 
taxes/subsidies could vary across households, denote the subsidy on household i’s combustion 
technology as  0 1 ≤ i t , and its tax on each unit of wood used as  0 2 ≥ i t . Household specific after 
subsidy/tax prices on combustion technologies and wood are 11 i p t +  and  22 i p t + ,  1,..., , in =  
respectively.  
Given the after subsidy/tax prices on combustion and wood, a household’s budget 
constraint is 
[5]  11 1 22 2 (1 ) ( ) ( ) iii i i i i wzyp t xp t x −= ++ + + . 
We do not examine how income taxes affect the optimal prices on combustion technologies and 
wood input, but we do assume that the government can fund the household pollution control 
program. To that end assume  
  11 22 111
;
nnn
ii i i i i iii
wz t x t x
===
≥+ ∑∑∑  
that is, the government’s income tax receipts are sufficient to meet the revenue requirements of 
the household pollution control program. If aggregate subsidy payments exceed the aggregate 
taxes on the wood input, then the difference is financed out of income tax receipts. If wood tax 
receipts exceed subsidies for more efficient combustion technologies, then the excess is simply 
added to the government’s budget.  
 
2.2 Household energy input choices 
A household’s decision problem is to choose a combustion technology, wood input, and 
consumption of the private good to maximize its expected utility subject to [1], [3], and [5]. That 11 
 
is, a household chooses  1 i x ,  2 i x , and  i y  to solve:  
[6]  () max ( , , , , ) ii ii i Eucya μ η   
    s.t.   12 (, ) ii i cc x x =  











⎝⎠ ∑   
where  (1 ) ii i ww z =−  is the household’s after tax income,  i E  denotes the expectation operator for 
household i. This expectation is with respect to the joint distribution of 
11 1 1 1 1 ( , , ,..., , ,..., , ,..., , ,..., ) ii n i i n μ θη η η η σ σ σ σ −+ −+ , conditional on  i η  and  i σ .  Substituting the 
constraints of [6] into its objective allows us to write the household’s problem as choosing  1 i x  
and  2 i x  to maximize  
[7]  12 1 11 2 22 1 2
1
( , ), ( ) ( ) , ( , , ), , ,
n
iii ii i ii ii k kk k i
k
Euc xx w p tx p txa rxxσθμ η
=
⎧⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎪⎪ −+ −+ ⎜⎟ ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎪⎪ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
∑ . 
Assume that the following first-order conditions determine each household’s optimal choices of 
combustion technology and wood consumption, given these choices by all the other households 
in the city:  
 [8]  ( ) 0, 1,..., , 1, 2. ii i i i
ij i j
ii j i ii j
uc u u r a
Ep t i n j
cx y arx
⎧⎫ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎪⎪ −+ + = = = ⎨⎬
∂∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
 
These first order conditions implicitly define Bayes-Nash best response functions, and the 
solution to these 2n equations, assuming that one exists, gives us a Bayes-Nash equilibrium 
distribution of wood use and combustion technologies in the urban area.  The first-order 
conditions reveal that each household will optimally choose the level of combustion technology 12 
 
and input use considering three elements; the marginal utility of the combustion technology or 
wood use in the generation of energy, the marginal reduction in utility from the reduction in 
spending on other private goods, and the marginal impact that the choice of technology or wood 
use has on the pollution damage the household experiences.  To the extent that the household can 
detect a change in ambient pollution from its own emissions (i.e.,  0 i ar ∂ ∂>) , the choice of a 
more efficient combustion technology reduces the pollution damage it suffers (because 
1 0 ii rx ∂∂<) while an increase in its use of wood increases the damage it suffers (because 
0 / 2 > ∂ ∂ i i x r ), holding the choices of all other households constant. Note that  0 i ar ∂∂>is the 
same for all i, because of our assumption that ambient pollution depends only on the sum of 
households’ emissions.   
 
2.3 Efficient household choices 
Optimal wood taxes and combustion technology subsidies internalize the external costs and 
benefits of the households’ choices. To determine the taxes and subsidies that will induce an 
efficient allocation of energy choices, we first derive an efficient allocation of wood use and 
combustion choices by maximizing an expected Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function.
9 
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⎝⎠ ∑ ,  
  s.t.  12 ( , ), 1,..., , ii i cc x x i n ==  
                                                 
9 The alternative method for finding efficient allocations is to maximize the expected budget-
constrained utility of one household while holding the expected budget-constrained utilities of 
the other households constant. Our results do not depend on maximizing a social welfare 
function, because the alternative methods are functionally equivalent.  13 
 
   11 22 , 1,..., , ii i i wyp xp xi n =+ + =   










⎝⎠ ∑  
In the objective of [9],  0,  1,..., , i in λ >=  are exogenous household utility weights.  g E refers to 
the expectation operator for the environmental authority, which is with respect to the joint 
distribution of  ) ,..., , ,..., , , ( 1 1 n n η η σ σ θ μ .  Our inclusion of household budget constraints in this 
problem (instead of, for example, posing production functions for combustion technologies and 
fuel wood) reflects the notion that an environmental agency with limited authority must design a 
control policy, given the existing distribution of income and income taxes, and the supplies of 
combustion technologies and fuel wood.  In particular, we do not aggregate the community’s 
income because the authority cannot make lump sum transfers of income among households.  
  Given the utility weights, if a solution to the program exists it will identify one of the 
many possible efficient allocations. All of the efficient allocations obtainable given the existing 
distribution of income can be identified by varying the utility weights. 
  For the existing distribution of income and utility weights, assume that the solution to [9] 
is characterized by the following first order conditions:   
[10]   0, ii i i i k i
ig j kg
ki ii j i ii j ii j
uc u u r u r aa
Ep E
cx y arx arx
λλ
≠
⎧⎫ ⎛ ⎞ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ⎪⎪ −+ + = ⎜⎟ ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂∂∂ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭ ⎝ ⎠
∑   1,...,  and  1,2. in j ==  





ii i k i
ig j g k
k ii j i ii j





⎧⎫ ⎧ ⎫ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎪⎪ ⎪ ⎪ −= − ⎨⎬ ⎨ ⎬
∂∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ⎪⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩⎭ ⎩ ⎭
∑ ,  1,...,  and  1,2. in j = =  14 
 
This is a modification of the usual Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson conditions for the efficient 
provision of a public good. The modifications come from two sources: (1) the context of 
household heating and cooking decisions that affect the public good of urban air quality in the 
developing world, and (2) the uncertainty in the model—the stochastic weather effects on air 
pollution and household utility as well as uncertainty about the use of combustion technologies 
and wood input.  
  The left side of [11] is the government’s weighted expectation of a household i’s 
marginal non-environmental net benefit of employing input j.  On the right side of [11] is 
government’s expectation of the impact of that decision on the weighted sum of marginal 
disutilities from urban air pollution.  Note that the sign of the right side of [11] depends on 
whether the energy input is the combustion technology or the wood input.  For the combustion 
technology (j = 1), the right side of [11] is negative because  () 1 0
n
kk k ua λ
= ∂ ∂< ∑ ,  0 i ar ∂∂>, 
and  1 0 ii rx ∂∂<. The negative sign indicates that the environmental authority’s expectation of 
aggregate pollution damage is decreasing when a household employs a more efficient 
combustion technology. On the other hand, the right side of [11] is positive for the wood input (j 
= 2), because  2 0 ii rx ∂∂ >. The positive sign indicates that expected aggregate pollution damage 
is increasing in a household’s use of wood.  
 
2.4 Efficient wood taxes and combustion technology subsidies  
Having characterized efficient allocations of combustion technologies and wood consumption, 
we now determine optimal taxes on wood consumption and subsidies for more efficient 
combustion technologies that will induce these choices.  Clearly, these will be second-best 
optimal policies because of the authority’s inability to make lump sum income transfers.  15 
 
   A simple modification of [8] gives us the government’s expectation of how households 
will respond to taxes and subsidies,  ij t   1,...,  and  1,2. in j = =   Simply replace the  's i E  in [8] with 
g E to reflect the fact that government uses its own expectation of households’ decision criteria to 
determine optimal taxes and subsidies.
10 After doing this substitute the result into [10] and 























,   1,...,  and  1,2. in j = =  
The denominator of [12] is the regulator’s expectation of household i’s marginal utility of 
consumption of the private good times the weight assigned to that household. This term is 
positive. The numerator is the environmental authority’s expectation of the marginal impact of 
household i’s choice of input j on weighted aggregate damage experienced by all the other 
households. This is the expected external cost (in the case of wood consumption) or benefit (in 
the case of combustion technology) from household i’s decision.  This term is negative if j is the 
combustion technology, confirming that  1 0 i t <  is a subsidy for the purchase of more efficient 
combustion technologies. The numerator is positive if j is the wood input, confirming that  2 0 i t >  








                                                 
10 Obviously, we require that the government and households hold symmetric beliefs about the 
stochastic relationships between pollution damage, household emissions, and household choices.   
 16 
 
3.  The control of urban air pollution and the distribution of household income.  
The presence of welfare weights and the marginal utility of private good consumption in the 
taxes/subsidies in [12] means that the distribution of income will play an important role in 
optimal policies to control urban air pollution.  
To understand how income disparity affects policy design, use [12] to subtract  hj t from 
kj t  for an arbitrary pair of households h and k and for both energy inputs j = 1, 2. Carrying out 
this subtraction and rearranging terms yields   
[13]  . kh h k k h
k jkg h jhg hg kg
kh k k j h h j
uuu r u r aa
tE tE E E
yya r x a r x
λλλ λ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂
−= − − ⎜ − ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 
On the right side of [13],  () () ( ) () hg h k k k j E uaa r rx λ −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  is the authority’s expectation of 
the weighted impact of household k’s choice of wood consumption or more efficient combustion 
technology on household h’s disutility from pollution. Therefore, one potential source of 
variation of wood taxes and combustion technology subsidies across households stem from 
differences between the impacts of each household’s choices on the pollution damage suffered 
by every other household. Since we are motivated by mid scale urban areas like Temuco, Chile 
with more than 80,000 households, the marginal impact of one household’s choices on some 
other’s utility is probably very small. Hence, we think it is reasonable to assume that right hand 
side of [13] is approximately zero so that 
[14]  () () kj k g k k hj h g h h tEuy tEuy λλ ∂∂≈ ∂∂, for all household pairs k and h, and j = 1, 2.  
For some household i and with j being the wood input,   ( ) ij i g i i tE uy λ ∂ ∂  is the 
government’s weighted expectation of the household’s marginal cost of the wood tax in terms of 
utility of consuming the private good. For the combustion technology, the term is the authority’s 17 
 
weighted expectation of the household’s marginal benefit of the technology subsidy.  The result 
in [14] indicates that the weighted expectation of the marginal cost of the wood tax should be 
approximately equal across households. The same is true of the combustion technology subsidy. 
This is reminiscent of the requirement to equate marginal abatement costs of commercial point 
pollution sources to minimize the aggregate abatement costs of pollution control.   
Our result in [14] also indicates that taxes and subsidies vary across households as 
() ig i i Eu y λ ∂∂ varies over households. Of course, the marginal utility of consumption of the 
private good,  ii uy ∂∂ , varies with household income. Diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption of the private good implies that  ii uy ∂ ∂  decreases as household i’s income 
increases. Therefore, [14] indicates that the distribution of income plays an important role in 
formulating policies to control urban air pollution from households.  
In fact,  () ig i i Eu y λ ∂∂ only varies across households if the authority is unable or 
unwilling to make unrestricted lump sum income transfers. When an authority makes these 
transfers,  kj hj tt ≈  for all household pairs k and h, and j = 1, 2. To see this, modify the social 
decision problem [9] by eliminating the individual household budget constraints and replacing 
them with the single aggregate income constraint, 
11 22 11 1 1 .
nn n n
ii i i ii i i wy p x p x
== = = =+ + ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
This modification allows an authority to distribute the aggregate income of the community in any 
way it wants.  Let φ  > 0 be the multiplier attached to the aggregate wealth constraint for the 
Lagrange equation for the problem. Then, the first order conditions for determining the 
allocation of wood use and combustion technologies are:   18 
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and the first order conditions for determining consumption of the private good are 
[16]   () 0, 1,..., .  ig i i Eu y i n λφ ∂∂− = =  
Combine [15] and [16] to obtain 
[17]    0, ii i i k i i
ig kg ig j
ki ii j ii j ii j i
uc u r u r u aa
EE E p
cx arx arx y
λλ λ
≠
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∑  
   1,...,  and  1,2. in j ==  
Note that [17] is the same as [10]. Therefore, combining this with [8] with  i E  replaced by 
g E  yields [12] and ultimately [14]. However, the major difference in assuming the government 
has the unrestricted ability to make lump sum transfers comes from [16], which implies  
[18]  () () , for all household pairs,   and  . kg k k hg h h Euy Euy k h λλ ∂∂= ∂∂  
This implies that the efficient pollution control policy would include income transfers so that 
households’ weighted expected marginal utilities of consumption of the private good are equal. 
For given utility weights and diminishing marginal utility of private good consumption, these 
income transfers would tend to be from richer households to poorer ones. If these transfers are 
made, [18] indicates that  () ig i i Eu y λ ∂∂plays no role in how an optimal control policy treats 
different households.  That is, efficient lump sum income transfers would imply that household 
wood taxes and combustion technology subsidies satisfy  kj hj tt ≈ , for all household pairs k and h, 
and j = 1, 2. 
However, as we noted earlier it is unlikely that these income transfers would be made a 
part of policies to control household air pollution.  In this case, the effect of income disparity on 19 
 
the efficient pollution control policy cannot be dealt with directly, but instead must be dealt with 
through the specification of household utility weights or through the variation in wood taxes and 
technology subsidies across households. The first option would make  ( ) ig i i Eu y λ ∂∂ the same 
for all households by varying the  's i λ . Since  ii uy ∂ ∂ will be higher for lower income households, 
this strategy would assign lower weights in the social welfare function to these households. It is 
hard to imagine a policy that is more arbitrary and unfair.  
Varying the wood taxes and combustion technology subsidies seems to us to be more 
defensible. From [14] it is easy to see that both the wood tax and the subsidy for more efficient 
combustion technologies will tend to be higher for higher income households. That is, if k is a 
wealthier household than h, then the combustion technology subsidies satisfy  11 kh tt −> −, and the 
wood consumption taxes  satisfy  22 kh tt > .  
At first glance it may seem paradoxical that income differences call for a higher subsidy 
for wealthier households.  However, the reason that efficiency calls for wealthier households to 
take on more of the burden of reducing air pollution than less wealthy households is to distribute 
the expected marginal utility costs of wood taxes and benefits of technology subsidies so they are 
equal.  With lump sum transfers this equilibration is accomplished by income redistribution. In 
the absence of these transfers it is accomplished by pushing more of the control burden onto 
wealthier households. To see why wealthier households take on more of the burden let us assume 
that we can tax household emissions directly.  We will show that the emissions tax is higher for 
wealthier households in the absence of lump sum income transfers, thereby demonstrating that 
efficiency calls for wealthier households to take on more of the burden of air pollution control.  20 
 
  Assume that the i
th household faces an emissions tax  i t  on its emissions  , i r  instead of tax 
on its wood consumption and a subsidy for more efficient combustion technologies.  Then the 
household’s decision problem is to choose  1 i x ,  2 i x , and  i y  to solve  
[19]  () max ( , , , , ) ii ii i Eucya μ η  
    s.t.  12 (, ) , ii i cc x x =  
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The first-order conditions are: 
[20]  0, 1,..., , 1, 2. ii i i i i
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As before, replace the 's i E  in [20] with  g E to reflect the fact that government uses its own 
expectation of the households’ decision criteria to determine optimal taxes and subsidies. After 
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To simplify matters, assume that the uncertainty in  , ii j rx ∂ ∂  j = 1,2  is uncorrelated with 
the uncertainty in  ii uy ∂∂  and in () ( ), ki uaa r ∂∂∂ ∂ for all  1,..., .  in = This allows us to 21 
 
eliminate  ii j rx ∂∂from [21].
11 Once this has been done, subtract  hj t from  kj t to obtain  
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Again, the right side expression is likely to be very small, so [22] implies  () kk g k k tEuy λ ∂∂≈  
() hh g h h tEuy λ ∂∂, for all household pairs k and h.  If the authority can tax household emissions 
but cannot make lump sum transfers of income across households, [22] suggests that the efficient 
tax on emissions is higher for higher income households. Thus, optimality calls for making 
higher income households bear more of the burden of controlling household air pollution.  
Of course, we have maintained that the main difficulty in this policy problem is that 
household emissions cannot be observed. When an authority can control wood consumption and 
combustion technologies it pursues policies that place more of the air pollution control burden on 
higher income households by placing a higher tax on their wood consumption and offering a 
higher subsidy for their purchase of more efficient combustion technologies. It is important to 
realize that a higher technology subsidy for wealthier households is not meant to correct income 
inequality. The purpose of the subsidy is to motivate the purchase of more efficient combustion 
technologies.  A higher technology subsidy for wealthier households is a part of how more 
control burden is optimally placed on wealthier households. It bears repeating, however, that the 
technology subsidy is only needed because household emissions cannot be controlled directly. 
Thus, it is the nonpoint nature of the problem combined with the inability of an authority to make 
                                                 
11 This lack of correlation could come about, for example, if there was no regulatory uncertainty 
about how household choices of wood consumption and combustion technology produce 
emissions.  If we are not able to eliminate  ii j rx ∂ ∂  from the right side of [21], a household’s 
emission tax would depend on the input j.  In this case, no emissions tax could simultaneously 
satisfy [20] for both the wood input and the combustion technology. This problem is discussed in 
another context by Shortle and Horan (2001).  22 
 
unrestricted lump sum income transfers that lead to higher technology subsidies for wealthier 
households. 
 
4.  Concluding remarks about implementation  
We have derived a set of efficient household-specific taxes on wood consumption and subsidies 
for more efficient combustion technologies. Our most important result is that these interventions 
are dependent of the distribution of income; in fact, efficiency requires that these taxes and 
subsidies be structured so that wealthier households take on more of the control burden. In this 
section we discuss some practical implementation issues associated with our results.  
Although we have assumed that taxes on wood consumption and subsidies for 
combustion technologies are available, in many settings in the developing world wood 
consumption is not observable. This may be due to the absence of formal markets for wood for 
heating, which is the case of wood used by urban households in central southern Chile.  The 
market for wood is mainly informal and no regulatory authority has actual control or transaction 
records.  In a recent survey of a sample of urban households in the city of Temuco, about 90% of 
the respondents acknowledged buying wood without paying taxes (CONAMA-DICTUC 2008).   
In the absence of the ability to monitor wood consumption, air pollution control policy 
would then focus on promoting cleaner combustion technologies. However, our result that 
income disparities imply that higher technology subsidies should be provided to higher income 
households becomes problematic. It is hard to imagine that there would be much political 
support for our recommendation.  
In fact, it may be the case that subsidies are only feasible if they are targeted at lower 
income groups. This is likely to be true in Chile where subsidies that are part of social welfare 
programs are targeted at the poor.  We are not aware of any environmental policy intervention in 23 
 
Chile that uses subsidies for household choices; however, it seems likely that such a policy 
would be implemented in concert with social policies that define how subsidies are allocated. 
Providing a higher technology subsidy to higher income households might appear to be at odds 
with other social welfare objectives. 
While higher technology subsidies for higher income households may be part of an 
efficient control program, they may not be part of a control policy that pursues other reasonable 
objectives. For example, an authority may be motivated to get the largest improvement in air 
quality with a limited budget to pay subsidies for more efficient combustion technologies. Then 
it may be the case that these subsidies should be directed mainly at poorer households if this is 
where the marginal reduction in emissions from a dollar of technology subsidy is highest. 
Pursuing the biggest environmental improvement for a fixed implementation budget is a 
reasonable policy objective, even though it will not lead to the theoretically efficient solution. 
However, it may be easier to understand than the idea of efficiency, and hence, easier to sell to 
lawmakers and the public.   
Even though we have assumed that combustion technologies are observable, and 
therefore can be subsidized, there is still a costly enforcement problem to manage. A monitoring 
and penalty program needs to be designed along with the incentive policy to make sure that those 
who take advantage of the subsidy actually purchase approved equipment and use it properly.   
Our results suggest that optimal technology subsidies and wood taxes vary continuously 
according to household incomes. While continuity is possible because authorities are likely to 
have income information for tax purposes, it is more likely that authorities will group households 
into a relatively small number of income classes and apply different subsidies and taxes to each 
class. Differentiated after-tax or after-subsidy prices produce the risk of developing so-called 24 
 
“black markets” in wood or combustion equipment. Black markets could also develop across 
communities that move efficient combustion equipment intended for one community to another. 
If this problem proves difficult to deal with, then authorities could be forced to consider 
implementing a uniform technology subsidy or wood tax despite the efficiency consequences.   
Our results also suggest that the efficient subsidies (and wood taxes if they are available) 
should vary across cities.  Although we have illustrated the problem of concern with the case 
study of Temuco in southern Chile, the same type of air pollution is a serious problem in several 
medium and small size cities in the valley south of the Chilean capital of Santiago.  Because of 
the heterogeneity across these cities in terms of population, income distribution, distribution of 
combustion technologies, the use of wood, and general environmental conditions, it is highly 
unlikely that the same control policy will be appropriate for different cities.  
A coordinated plan may also be required to manage the flow of retired equipment across 
communities. An effective equipment subsidy program will generate a stock of discarded stoves. 
If these are not destroyed, they may be available to other communities at significantly reduced 
prices. Because of this a stove replacement program in one community can have environmental 
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